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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
The caption of this case identifies all parties to this proceeding.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide this appeal pursuant to section 782a-2(b)(i) of the Utah Code.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Is the decision of the Utah County Career Service Council (the "Council"),

finding that appellants' grievance was timely filed, properly reviewed for clear error,
granting considerable deference to the Council's resolution of a disputed issue of fact?
Which standard of review applies is a question of law, reviewed by this Court for
correctness. See Lvsenko v. Sawava. 2000 UT 58, Tf 15, 7 P.3d 783 (Utah 2000).
2.

Was the Council's determination that the Deputies' grievance was timely

filed arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable?
Because the trial court reviewed the Council's record in an appellate function, and
because this is an appeal from an order granting the County's motion under Rule 65B,
this Court reviews the Council's decision directly and affords no deference to the trial
court's ruling. See Wells, 936 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Tolman v. Salt
Lake County. 818 P.2d 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-4(l)(d)(iv) and Rule 65B(d)(4) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Council's timeliness decision is presumptively valid and
cannot be overturned unless it constitutes "a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion." See
State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 923 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Indian Village Trading Post,
222027.8
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Inc. v. Bench, 929 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Renn v. Utah State Bd. of
Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-4-(l)(d)(iv) ("In reviewing a decision of the career
service council, the district court shall presume that the decision is valid and may
determine only whether the decision is arbitrary or capricious.").
Rule 65B(d)(4) ("Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, the
court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether the respondent has
regularly pursued its authority.").
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final order of the Fourth Judicial District Court,
Honorable Fred D. Howard, granting Utah County's Petition for Extraordinary Relief,
filed pursuant to Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and reversing the
decision of the Utah County Career Service Council (the "Council") in favor of
Appellants George S. Alexanderson and Charles Martin (the "Deputies").
The Deputies are employed by the Utah County Sheriffs Department.1 Deputy
Charles Martin was hired by the Department on January 13, 1986. On June 24, 1987, he
was promoted to the rank of Shift Supervisor, a first-line supervisor position, within the
Jail Division of the Department. (R. 381) Deputy George Alexanderson was hired by the
Department on February 8, 1988. On April 30, 1990, he was promoted 1o the rank of
1

After the Utah County Career Service Council issued its decision in favor of the
Deputies, and while this matter was pending before the trial court, Deputy Martin retired.
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Shift Supervisor, a first-line supervisor position within the Jail Division of the
Department. (R. 330) The position of Shift Supervisor was, at all relevant times, a
ranked, first-line supervisor position within the Department generally, including the Jail
Division. The Department authorized all officers who held the rank of Shift Supervisor
to wear evidence and insignia of that rank—corporal stripes—on their Department
uniforms, and officers who held this rank regularly did so. (R. 330)
In 1991, the County conducted a "reclassification study" which included an
analysis of the positions within the Department, including the jail division. As a result of
that study, and based upon recommendations made by the Department, the rank of Shift
Supervisor within the Department was eliminated, or "reclassified," as a Sergeant
position and rank, with higher pay. (R. 330) The job duties and responsibilities carried
out by Shift Supervisors, prior to the elimination of that rank, were materially identical to
the job duties and responsibilities carried out by Sergeants at that time. Indeed, this was
one purpose of the reclassification: To make the rank structure consistent with the duties
and responsibilities carried out by particular officers. (R. 330) As Shift Supervisors
serving within the Jail Division of the Department, the Deputies reasonably understood
and believed, based upon assurances and representations made to them by Department
management and Shift Supervisor meetings and in other settings, and on the fact that it
was not expected that the duties of the position would be changed in any material way,
that they would be promoted to the rank and position of Sergeant as a result of the
reclassification. (R. 379) Due to budgetary constraints, staffing needs, and other factors,
While his retirement resolved certain issues related to retroactive advancement in rank, it
222027.8
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the Department decided not to promote all those previously serving as Shift Supervisors
within the Jail Division of the Department to the rank of Sergeant, but to instead open
four newly created Sergeant positions to interested applicants. (R. 379)
After the reclassification, but before the newly created Sergeant positions were
filled, the Deputies, and others serving as Shift Supervisors, were demoted from the rank
of Shift Supervisor to the position of Corrections Specialist. Then the rate of pay for a
Corrections Specialist was increased to match that previously paid to Shift Supervisors,
thereby eliminating the pay differential that the deputies had previously enjoyed. Despite
this demotion, the Deputies were instructed to perform substantially the same duties they
had previously been performing as Shift Supervisors, and also to continue to wear the
evidence and insignia of the rank of Shift Supervisor. (R. 379). The Deputies did as they
were ordered. (R. 379) The Deputies, together with other interested applicants,
including others previously serving as Shift Supervisors within the Jail Division of the
Department, expressed their desire to be considered for the four newly created Sergeant
positions by submitting a letter of interest and resume, as requested by the Department.
(R. 378)
At the time the Department was considering these expressions of interest in the
four newly-created Sergeant positions, it had established and had in effect certain jobrelated minimum qualifications for the position. These included, among other things,
"current POST Certification, and current CPR Certification [and] requires B.S. Degree,
including 30 semester hours in psychology, sociology, interpersonal relations, or closely
did not resolve his entitlement to back pay, as ordered by the Council.
222027 8

A

related fields." (R. 378) At this time, the Department also had established and had in
effect certain advancement policies which, by their terms, were to remain in effect until
rescinded or revised. For the Jail Division, these policies included a requirement that all
those seeking promotion "will be subject to" written examination, oral interview, and the
review of evaluations and length of service. (R. 378) In addition, those policies provided
that promotion to the rank of Sergeant within the jail division required "[t]hree (3) years
of Correctional Experience, including one (1) year as a Shift Supervisor." (R. 378)
The policies referred to above were in effect at all relevant times, and remained in
effect until after the conclusion of the proceedings before the Council. In fact, apparently
in response to the Deputies arguments before the Council, Sheriff Bateman issued a
memorandum dated November 26, 1997, formally rescinding the policies "effective
immediately." (R. 377) At the time the Department filled the four newly-created
Sergeant positions, the Deputies each possessed the required qualifications for the newlycreated positions and otherwise met all established advancement policies. Neither
Deputy had disciplinary records within the Department, and each had previously been
commended for their work as Shift Supervisors. Neither Deputy was promoted into one
of the newly-created Sergeant positions. (R. 377)
When the Department filled the newly-created Sergeant positions, the Department
failed to hold a written examination, failed to conduct oral interviews, and failed to
consider the length of service, including correctional experience and experience as a Shift
Supervisor, all in violation of established policy. (R. 377) In addition, as the Deputies
later discovered, when the Department filled the newly-created Sergeant positions, three
222027.8
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of the four individuals it promoted did not meet the established minimum qualifications
for the position, or otherwise failed to meet established advancement policies. (R. 376)
The Department, in violation of its policies, promoted individuals who were not POSTcertified, or who did not hold a college degree, or who did not have corrections
experience, or experience as a Shift Supervisor. (R. 376) Two individuals who formerly
held the rank of Shift Supervisor in the Jail Division were promoted to the newly-created
Sergeant positions. Neither of those individuals held "current POST Certification" at the
time they were promoted, and therefore did not possess the minimum qualifications
necessary to hold the rank of Sergeant. (R. 376) The third sergeant position was filled
by Dennis Howard, an individual from outside the Jail Division who did not possess the
minimum qualifications to hold the rank of Sergeant in the Jail Division, because he did
not possess a college degree and had never attained the rank of Shift Supervisor, as
required by Department policy. (R. 376)
Four individuals who held the rank of Shift Supervisor in the Jail Division were
not promoted to Sergeant in the 1991 "reclassification." These included Deputy Martin,
Deputy Alexanderson, Deputy Rod Robinson, and Deputy John Gruenbaum. (R. 376)
At or about the time of these promotions, Deputy Rod Robinson was "demoted" for cause
arising out of an internal affairs investigation. (R. 376) In a disciplinary letter from
Sheriff Bateman to Deputy Robinson, Sheriff Bateman characterized Deputy Robinson's
discipline as follows: "The issue of disciplinary action shall be disposed as follows: 1,
2

The fourth and final Sergeant position was filled by an Administrative Sergeant within
the Jail Division of the Department. (R. 376) While his appointment to that position was
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reduction of rank to Corrections Specialist. This issue has become moot as a result of the
reclassification of the Shift Supervisor position." (R. 375) In other words, Deputy
Robinson was demoted for cause to the rank of Corrections Specialist. Deputies Martin
and Alexanderson, along with Deputy Gruenbaum, were also demoted, without cause, to
that same rank. (R. 375) After the Deputies were passed over for promotion to the rank
of Sergeant, they were instructed to and did remove the evidence and insignia of their
prior rank from their department uniforms, and those who were promoted to the rank of
Sergeant were instructed and did wear the evidence and insignia of their new rank. (R.
375) The new Sergeants also received a corresponding pay increase. (R. 375)
After the reclassification, the responsibilities and duties of Sergeants within the
Jail Division of the Department were intended to be and were in fact substantially similar
to the responsibilities and duties previously performed by Shift Supervisors within the
Jail Division of the Department. (R. 375) After Deputy Alexanderson was passed over
for promotion, and as a result of the humiliation and frustration he felt at being demoted
to the same grade and pay level within the Jail Division he had previously supervised, he
requested and received a transfer to the Patrol Division of the Department, and later to the
Warrants Division, where he currently serves as a Deputy-in-Charge. (R. 374)
After Deputy Martin was passed over for a promotion to the rank of Sergeant, he
was on the same grade and pay level as those in the Jail Division he had previously
supervised. (R. 374) Deputy Martin was ordered to and did train those promoted over
him to the rank of Sergeant. (R. 374) Deputy Martin trained these individuals because
not in violation of policy, it also was not a promotion because he already held the rank of
222027.8
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their duties were substantially the same as the duties he had capably performed for more
than four years. (R. 374) As a result of the humiliation and frustration Deputy Martin
felt at being demoted to the same grade and pay level as those within the Jail Division he
had previously supervised, he requested and received a transfer to the Animal Control
Division of the Department in June of 1992, where he served as Deputy-in-Charge. (R.
374) On December 7, 1998, after the proceedings before the Council, and while this
matter had been pending on appeal to the trial court, Deputy Martin retired from the
Department. (R. 374)
After the Deputies were demoted, they informally complained to their superiors
about not having been promoted. (R. 374) The Deputies were repeatedly assured by
members of the administration, including the Sheriff, that their concerns would be
addressed internally, that they were eligible to and should continue to pairticipate in the
promotion process, and that they ultimately would be promoted to the rank of Sergeant.
(R. 374) The Deputies relied upon these assurances and continued their efforts to
informally resolve their grievance within the Department, and obtain promotions through
ongoing participation in the various offered promotional processes. (R. 373-74) Both
Deputies, in the time period after their demotions but before the filing of their grievance
based upon merit principles, in good faith and on numerous occasions, continued to
participate in the wide variety of "testing" or "evaluation" procedures employed by the
Department, and otherwise expressed their continued interest in being considered for
advancement to the rank of Sergeant. In each case, however, they were passed over for
Sergeant. (R. 376)
222027.8
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promotion. (R. 373) The Deputies later learned that the Department, on numerous
occasions beginning in at least December 1991, promoted individuals who did not meet
the established job-related minimum qualifications and were not, under the Department's
own policies, eligible for promotion. (R. 373) During this time, the Department also
failed to conduct appropriate testing, failed to establish correct eligibility lists or
appointment registers, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-7, and failed to make
eligibility lists and appointment registers available for inspection by applicants. (R. 374)
In addition, the Deputies were repeatedly assured by Department management that
they would be treated fairly as a result of the "reclassification" culminating in the
Sheriffs final assurance in 1996, when he promised to investigate and "make it right."
(R. 370) The deputies were urged by Department management to continue to apply for
promotions within the Department, which they did for some time. However, the
promotion and eligibility requirements fluctuated widely, and were often disregarded by
the Department and the County Personnel Office. (R. 370)
On December 9, 1996, the Deputies learned about an incident involving attempted
manipulation of department testing. At that time, Sergeant Mike Morgan told the
Deputies that he had been contacted by a Lieutenant in the Department. (R. 369) The
Lieutenant asked him to write down questions that would appear on the test, and
consulted with him about those questions. (R. 369) The Lieutenant then asked about a
particular candidate that Sergeant Morgan was supervising, a candidate who the
Lieutenant thought should get the promotion that was involved in the testing. (R. 369)
The Lieutenant said to Sergeant Morgan, "Well, I guess if you left these questions on
222027.8
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your desk and somebody walked in and happened to see them when you weren't in there,
you couldn't be held responsible for that." (R. 369) Sergeant Morgan, to his credit,
refused to participate in what was clearly unlawful conduct, and shredded the questions.
(R. 369)
Eight days later, on December 17, 1996, the Deputies, in direct response to their
December 9 discovery of the Department's illegal actions, met with Sheriff Bateman to
discuss their concerns regarding promotions and the evidence of corruption within the
Department. (R. 369) The Deputies asked Sheriff Bateman to investigate and remedy
the situation. (R. 369) On December 30, 1996, Sheriff Bateman sent a letter to Deputy
Martin responding to some of the issues raised in the December 17 meeting. (R. 341,
369) In that letter, Sheriff Bateman stated for the first time that "[t]he
issue of automatic advancement of Shift Supervisors is not warranted because the
position of'"Shift Supervisor'" was never a ranked position . . . " (R. 341, 368) This was
the first time that the Sheriff had contended that Shift Supervisor was not a ranked
position, and the first time he had articulated that this was the reason why the Deputies
were not given automatic advancement to the rank of Sergeant after their ranked position
was eliminated. (R. 368) In this letter, Sheriff Bateman also conceded for the very first
time, that there had been "inconsistencies" in the Department's promotional processes.
(R. 340, 368)
In December 1996, the Deputies discovered serious irregularities, dating back
several years, in the processes utilized by the Utah County Sheriff (the "Sheriff) to make
career service promotions within the Department. The Deputies also discovered that
222027.8
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some of these irregularities had resulted in their being passed over for promotion to the
rank of Sergeant. Specifically, the Deputies learned for the first time that the Sheriff had
been operating for all relevant years on the erroneous assumption that the Shift
Supervisor rank held by the Deputies in 1991 was "not a ranked position in the
Department." In the December 1996 meeting, the Sheriff cited this erroneous assumption
as the basis for having denied the Deputies5 promotions in 1991. In later proceedings
before the Council, the Sheriff was forced to abandon this position, and ultimately
testified that it was "patently obvious to anybody" that shift supervisor was, in fact, a
ranked position.
Armed with their recently-acquired knowledge that the Department's failure to
promote them was based on faulty premises, and that promotions generally may have
been flawed, on January 10, 1997, the Deputies filed a grievance with the Utah County
Career Service Council4 (the "Council") challenging the promotion procedures employed
During his testimony before the Council, Sheriff Bateman acknowledged that, in fact,
Shift Supervisor was a ranked position. Sheriff Bateman testified as follows:
Q:
Is it your testimony, then, that the Shift Supervisor
position is a ranked position, or was considered a ranked
position?
A:
It was considered a ranked position, but in a limited
context. It was a ranked position of the jail, and it was a
ranked position in the Civil Division, but that's all.
Q:

It was a ranked position?

A:

I think that's patently obvious to anybody.

(R. 368)
The Council is "a three-member appeals and personnel advisory board" that, by statute,
must be comprised of "persons in sympathy with the application of merit principles to
222027.8
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by the Sheriff and the Sheriffs continued failure to promote them to the rank of Sergeant.
The Council heard argument and evidence on March 27, 1997, April 23, 1997, and May
29, 1997. The Deputies presented evidence that between 1991 and 1996 they had tried, at
the Department's urging, to resolve these issues internally, that they had been repeatedly
assured that promotions were forthcoming, and that they continued to participate in good
faith in Sergeant's testing on the basis of these assurances. The Council also heard
evidence that the Department had for years concealed basic evidence that it was required
by policy and law to make available, and which ultimately supported the Deputies'
claims. The County's principal argument before the Council, and its principal argument
before the trial court, was that the Deputies had failed to file their grievamce within the
three-month time limit established by the Council's own rules.
On the basis of the evidence presented, the Council issued a written decision in
favor of the Deputies (the Council's "first decision") on June 30, 1997. (R. 349)
Specifically, the Council "reconfirm[ed]" that the Deputies' case should not be time
barred and determined that the Deputies' "discussion with Sheriff Bateman in December,
1996 was the date that should drive the time for filing." Because the Deputies filed
public employment." Utah Code Ann. §17-33-2(2); id § 17-33-4(l)(a). Section VII E.l
of the Utah County Office of Personnel Management Rules and Regulation States in
relevant part:
Any career service employee who has completed a Schedule
B probationary period or a promotional trial period having a
grievance over merit principles may appeal to the Career
Service Council. The employee must file a written notice
with the personnel director within three months from the date
of the occurrence.
(R. 247)
222027.8
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within three months of that date, their claim was not barred. (R. 348) Regarding the
merits, the Council determined that "promotions have been based on arbitrary criteria.
The current testing procedures appear inconsistent, biased and capricious. Evidence
supported the fact that some employees were promoted to the Sergeant's rank that did not
meet the qualifications outlined in the various policies." (R. 349) As a result, the
Council recommended "that the county implement standardized and unbiased testing
procedures. All policies regarding promotional testing should be updated, consistent with
each other, clearly communicated to all applicable employees, and carefully followed."
(R. 349) By way of remedy, the Council recommended (1) that the Deputies be
promoted to the rank of Sergeant, effective immediately, and (2) that the Deputies be paid
at the Sergeant's level retroactive to December 9, 1991, taking into account cost of living
adjustments but not including merit increases "and other possible related benefits
commensurate with the rank of Sergeant." (R. 349)
On July 15, 1997, the County filed its petition with the trial court, pursuant to Rule
65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 245-329) The Deputies responded with a
motion to dismiss. (R. 46) The trial court denied the Deputies' motion in an October 22,
1997 order, and also remanded the case to the Council "for the entry of findings of fact
and conclusions of law in connection with its decision of June 30, 1997." (R. 119) The
trial court noted that pending this remand for the entry of findings, the trial court would
"retain jurisdiction over this matter pending the entry of such findings of fact and
conclusions of law by the Council." (R. 119) The trial court's remand order specifically
stated that the Council could "[m]ake such changes, additions, or modifications to its
222027 8
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decision as it may deem necessary or desirable . . . and [d]o other such things . . . as it
may deem necessary or desirable to clarify or enhance the record of the proceedings for
eventual review" by the trial court, but did not authorize the Council to vacate or
otherwise reverse the decision. (R. 119 (emphasis added)) The trial court anticipated
that once the Council made findings and conclusions, it would "then perform its review . .
. in accordance with applicable law and as requested by Utah County in its petition for
extraordinary relief." (R. 118)
Following the trial court's remand order, the Council did nothing for more than
two years. The task of preparing findings and conclusions initially was assigned to Ryan
Robert Beuhring a Council member who had participated in the decision. In a highly
unusual move, the County Personnel Director had an ex parte communication with Mr.
Beuhring about the decision and the fact that the County could not enforce nor afford to
pay for the result of the June 30 decision.5 The County could have permitted Mr.

5

On September 8, 2000, Mr. Beuhring filed an affidavit with the trial court. (R. 239-242)
In his affidavit, he stated that when the trial court remanded the case to the Council, his
"term on the Council [was] [about to] expire. However, it would not have been unusual
for the Affiant to continue to serve to finish cases under consideration." (R. 241)
Beuhring further stated that during his "final month on the Council" the Personnel
Director of Utah County had an ex parte discussion with Beuhring concerning the
Deputies' grievance. During their discussion, the Personnel Director made the comment
to Beuhring that Utah County could not enforce nor afford to pay for the result of the
June 30, 1997 decision. Beuhring reaffirmed that he sustained and would uphold the
decision of the Council regarding the result of the Deputies' grievance. The Personnel
Director then commented to Beuhring that he could be replaced on the Council because
his term was expiring. In fact, his term on the Council did expire, and he was not
permitted to finish the Deputies' case. At the time he was working on the case, the
Council as a whole believed that the findings and conclusions submitted by the Deputies'
counsel "were fairly representative of the views held by the Council." "On the other
hand, the Council of a whole did not believe that the majority of the County's proposed
222027.8
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Beuhring to complete the findings and conclusions. It chose not to do so, however, and
an entirely new Council, none of whom had participated in the decision, was left the task
of preparing findings and conclusions. More than two years later, on November 29,
1999, the Council issued a written decision (the "second decision") in which it declined
to enter findings of fact and instead claimed, erroneously, that the trial court should
review the matter de novo under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-16. (R. 146) The Council also determined that its June 30, 1997
determination was a "'final decision' in this matter as contemplated by [Utah Code Ann.
§] 63-46b-5(i)." (R. 146) The Deputies pointed out to the Council that the matter was
not subject to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, and then the case languished for
several more months.
On April 10, 2000, the trial court entered an order to show cause why the Council
should not be held in contempt. (R. 157-58). In response, the Council issued another
decision (the "third decision") which purported to vacate the original, June 1997 decision,
in violation of the trial court's remand order. (R. 1133-37) In this third decision, the
Council did not squarely address the Council's first determination that the three-month
rule began to run upon the Deputies' December, 1996 meeting with Sheriff
Bateman. Instead, the Council noted cursorily that the Deputies' January 10, 1997
"grievance was not timely and is dismissed. Any prior contrary finding or conclusion of
the previous Council is vacated." (R. 1134)

findings and conclusions were consistent with the evidence and testimony given, and, in
fact, seemed counter intuitive to the findings of the Council." (R. 240-41)
222027.8
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The Deputies objected to the Council's third decision, (R. 164-77), and the matter
was briefed and argued by both parties. On September 12, 2000 the trial court issued a
minute entry stating, in pertinent part, that the Council's "first decision was final, District
Court retained jurisdiction and findings must be consistent with the first decision of the
[Council]." (R. 243) Thus, at this point, the Council's first decision was reaffirmed by
the trial court and remained the final order of the Council.
At Utah County's request, the court allowed additional briefing on the timeliness
of the Deputies' filing. While Utah County's petition was being briefed, the court
entered its order regarding the Council's third decision. (R. 396-99) In its Order
Sustaining Objections, the trial court stated that
After having reviewed the file including the memoranda of
the parties, after having heard the oral arguments of the
parties, and after having been fully informed in the premises,
the Court finds and concludes that the [Council] failed to
follow the Court's Order dated October 27, 1997, and
exceeded the Council's jurisdiction by entering it's [sic] April
27, 2000 Ruling, that the Court by it's [sic] October 27, 1997
Order had retained jurisdiction over the matter and the
purpose of the Court's Order was for the entry of findings of
fact and conclusions of law consistent with the Council's
Ruling of June 30, 1997, that the Council's April 27, 2000
Ruling was inconsistent with it's [sic] June 30, 1997 Ruling,
that the Court should disregard the Council's April 27, 2000
Ruling, that the Court should proceed and decide the issues
raised by the Petitioner's Petition For Extraordinary Relief in
light of the Council's actions without the benefit of findings
of fact and conclusions of law, and that the Respondents'
objections to the April 27, 2000 Ruling of the Utah County
Career Service Council should be sustained.
(R. 398-99 (emphasis added))
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After oral argument on Utah County's petition for extraordinary relief, on
September 27, 2001, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision upholding the
Council's determination that the "testing procedures were at best inconsistent, and very
likely involved subjective criteria to the point of being arbitrary and violative of merit
principles." (R. 1453-60) The trial court, however, abruptly reversed the Council's
determination that the Deputies' grievance was timely. In doing so, the trial court
reviewed the timeliness decision as a matter of law and gave no deference to the
Council's determination. (R. 1456) Based on its conclusion that the Deputies' grievance
was untimely as a matter of law, the trial court entered an Order Granting Petition for
Extraordinary Relief on January 2, 2002. (R. 1461-62) This appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Utah County Sheriffs Office was engaged in widespread, systematic
violations of the merit principles it was legally obligated to apply in making promotion
decisions. Because of these irregularities, the Deputies were not advanced to the rank of
Sergeant as they otherwise should have been. Instead, the Deputies were placed in the
untenable position of being supervised by former subordinates who had been improperly
promoted to the rank of Sergeant instead of the Deputies. The Council and the trial court
repeatedly upheld the Council's initial determination that the County's promotion
procedures violated merit principles. Importantly, the County has not appealed this
determination.
The trial court also initially resisted attacks on the Council's determination that the
Deputies' grievance had been timely filed. When the Council made this determination, it
222027 8
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found that the three-month rule began to run in December 1996, when the Deputies met
with Sheriff Bateman and learned for the first time that the promotion and eligibility
requirements fluctuated widely and were often disregarded by Department management,
and that the Deputies had been denied promotion based on the erroneous position that
Shift Supervisor was not a ranked position. However, in a January 2002 order, the trial
court abruptly reversed field and concluded, as a matter of law, that the Deputies'
grievance was untimely.
This Court reviews the Council's decision directly, rather than reviewing the
decision of the trial court. Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991). It therefore gives deference to the trial court's reversal of the Council's
timeliness ruling. IdL The Council's factual determination that the Deputies did not learn
of their cause of action until December 1996 should be afforded great deference because
the Council sat in a privileged position as fact finder. In addition, even to the extent
questions of law are involved, a reviewing court must give an extra measure of deference
to the Council. Because the record supports the Council's first decision and the trial
court's reversal was erroneous, the Council's June 30, 1997 decision should be affirmed
and the trial court's January 2, 2002 Order Granting Petition for Extraordinary Relief
should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
In its June 30, 1997 ruling, the Council specifically found (1) that the Deputies'
grievance was timely filed; (2) that the Deputies had been improperly passed over for
promotion to the rank of Sergeant; and (3) that department promotions in general "have
222027.8
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been based on arbitrary criteria . . . " and "current testing procedures appear inconsistent,
biased, and capricious." The Council ordered immediate promotion of the Deputies to
the rank of Sergeant and back pay to December 9, 1991, the date on which they were first
improperly passed over for promotion. The Council also recommended that the County
implement standardized and unbiased testing procedures and that policies regarding
promotional testing be updated, consistent with each other, clearly communicated to
applicable employees, and carefully followed.
The County's main challenge below was to the Council's finding that the Deputies
had timely filed. The County argued that the Deputies failed to comply with the threemonth rule set forth in the Council's own rules. Importantly, the three month rule is not
based on a statute, but rather is found only in the County's own personnel rules.
The Council took up the issue of timeliness on three separate occasions and, each
time, took evidence and heard arguments of counsel on the subject. On each occasion,
the Council unanimously rejected the County's timeliness argument and held that the
Deputies' grievance was timely filed. The Council's finding that the petition was timely
filed was based on its conclusion that the Deputies' meeting with the Sheriff in December
1996 was the triggering event for purposes of applying the three-month rule. The
Council's decision to reach back to the time of the 1991 promotional decision at issue
was justified by the Department's repeated assurances of promotion to the Deputies, by
their discovery in December 1996 of the erroneous basis upon which they had been
denied promotions, and by the Council's careful examination of each promotional
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process from 1991 to 1996, an examination that revealed widespread irregularities and
showed that the Department had concealed basic facts relating to the promotion process.
This Court should reverse the trial court's January 2, 2002 ruling for two reasons.
First, the trial court should have applied a highly deferential standard of review to the
Council's multiple fact determinations that the Deputies' grievance was timely filed.
Because the question of whether the Deputies knew or should have known the facts
forming their cause of action on a certain date is a classic question of fact, the Council's
determination in this regard should only be reversed if the record does not support the
determination, "resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the
[Council's] determination." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).
Second, even if the Council's determination is reviewed as a question of law—a
standard incorrectly applied by the trial court—the Council's determinalion that the
grievance was timely filed should still be affirmed. Under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, the reviewing court (whether trial court or appellate court) grants an
extra measure of deference to the lower tribunal's ruling, even when the decision
involves an issue of law. Thus, the trial court should have reversed the Council's
determination only if the determination was a gross and flagrant abuse of the Council's
discretion. Because the record supports the Council's timeliness determination—and in
fact was reaffirmed numerous times by the Council—the trial court's January 2, 2002
ruling should be reversed and the Council's June 30, 1997 ruling allowed to stand.
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1.

The trial court incorrectly reviewed the council's timeliness
determination as a pure question of law rather than a mixed question
of fact and law.

The County's challenge below was premised on its assertion that the Council's
timeliness determination should be reviewed for correctness, affording no deference to
the Council's privileged position as a finder of fact. The trial court, perhaps
unaccustomed to sitting in an appellate capacity, adopted this position and reviewed the
Council's timeliness determination as a matter of law. This approach was erroneous.
Importantly, there is no statute setting forth the three-month rule; it is instead purely an
internal rule. The Council determined that the Deputies' grievance was timely because
the Deputies did not know, or have reason to know, of their injury and its cause. The
reasoning is therefore analogous to the discovery rule applied in the context of statutes of
limitation. In that context, a determination of whether the facts of a particular case
support the application of the discovery rule is a decision composed of subsidiary parts:
first, a determination of whether, as a matter of law, the discovery rule should apply; and
second, a close analysis of whether the particular facts of an individual case warrant the
tolling of the statute of limitations. As such, this overarching question of whether the
discovery rule should apply to the particular facts of a case is best described as a mixed
question of fact and law because it is a "determination of whether a given set of facts
comes within the reach of a given rule of law."6 State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah
6

The clear majority of courts considering this question "hold that, for the purposes of the
discovery rule, ascertaining whether the plaintiff engaged in reasonable diligence or when
the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury is a question for the trier of fact."
51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 430 (collecting cases); see also Callahan v. State,
464 N.W.2d 268, 273 (Iowa 1990); Cooper v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co.. 2002 WL
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1994); see also Drake v. Industrial Common. 939 P.2d 177, 181 n.6 (Utah 1997)
(adopting Pena analysis for review of administrative agency actions).
In general, the statute of limitations begins to run "when the last event necessary
to complete the cause of action occurs." Sew v. Security Title Co.. 902 P.2d 629, 634
(Utah 1995). However, the discovery rule forms an exception to the general rule
regarding the triggering of the statute of limitations, under which the limitation period
does not begin to run "until the discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of
action." Id. (citations omitted). The discovery rule applies in three situations:
(1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by
statute; (2) in situations where a plaintiff does not become
aware of the cause of action because of the defendant's
concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in situations
where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the
application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust,
regardless of any showing that the defendant has prevented
the discovery of the cause of action.
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992). A court determining
whether a statute of limitations is tolled by the discovery rule must perform at least two
analytical steps. First, the court must consider whether the case falls under one of the
three areas delineated in Warren as being suitable for the discovery rule. Second, the
court must consider whether the facts of the particular case before it support the
application of the discovery rule.
The first analytical step involves questions of, for example, whether the discovery
rule falls within one of the two Warren areas, or whether a "particular action[] or
1980449, *23 (Md. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2002); Black Bear Lodge v. Trillium Corp., 620
A.2d 428, 430 (N.H. 1993); Matson v. Weidenkopf, 3 P.3d 805, 811 (Wash. Ct. App.
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omission[ is] crucial to the application of the discovery rule to particular causes of
action." Sew v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 635 (Utah 1995). This first prong
presents a question of law, one that is given no deference because the reviewing court is
in as good a position as the lower court to analyze the law. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 936.
This standard has also been applied to a discovery rule analysis where no facts were in
dispute, as in two cases cited by the County below, Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d
1125 (Utah 1992), and Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990). In those cases,
where there were no subsidiary issues of fact to be determined, review as a matter of law
was proper. See Sew, 902 P.2d 634-35 (declining to rule as matter of law on discovery
rule issue in fact of disputed issue of face and holding "that the issue of when a claimant
discovered or should have discovered the facts, forming the basis of a cause of action is a
question of fact, and the fact finder's conclusion cannot be overturned on appeal unless it
is clearly erroneous").
Thus, in a case such as this where the facts were in dispute, a second analytical
step is required. Once the court has concluded as a matter of law that the discovery rule
can apply, it must also consider whether application of the rule is merited on the facts of
the specific case before it. In doing so, the court must necessarily resolve factual issues
about whether, for example, a defendant has concealed the existence of a cause of action.
By its very nature, application of the discovery rule requires a determination of when a
party discovered the facts necessary to create a cause of action. The question of when a
party actually discovered the facts necessary to support a cause of action is "'a classic
2000).
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factual dispute that should be resolved by the finder of fact.'" Id. at 634 (quoting
Andreini v. Hultgren. 860 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1993)). "Factual questions are generally
regarded as entailing the empirical, such as things, events, actions, or conditions
happening, existing, or taking place, as well as the subjective, such as state of mind."
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). In this case, the Council was faced with a
determination of when the Deputies discovered their cause of action—a classic question
of fact, being an "event[], action[], or condition[] happening, existing, or taking place."
Id. Because the Council was sitting as fact finder, it was in an advantaged position to
"assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole,
something an appellate court cannot hope to garner from a cold record."7 State v. Pena,
7

Pena illustrates why the Council's determination should be afforded considerable
deference on review as a question of fact. That landmark standards of review case
explained that there are
three reasons that are useful in discerning when some degree
of discretion ought to be left to a trial court: (i) when the
facts to which the legal rule is to be applied are so complex
and varying that no rule adequately addressing the relevance
of all these facts can be spelled out; (ii) when the situation to
which the legal principle is to be applied is sufficiently new to
the courts that appellate judges are unable to anticipate and
articulate definitively what factors should be outcome
determinative; and (iii) when the trial judge has observed
'facts,' such as a witness's appearance and demeanor,
relevant to the application of the law that cannot be
adequately reflected in the record available to the appellate
court.

Pena, 869 P.2d at 938-39. Two of these factors apply to the present case, lending further
support to a grant of considerable deference to the Council's timeliness determination.
First, the facts supporting the application of the discovery rule necessarily vary from case
to case, so that no general rule can be articulated to govern every situation. In each case,
then, the finder of fact must determine anew whether facts exist to support application of
222027 8

869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). The Utah Supreme Court has previously held that "the
issue of when a claimant discovered or should have discovered the facts forming the basis
of a cause of action is a question of fact, and the fact finder's conclusion cannot be
overturned on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous." Sew, 902 P.2d 634.
In essence, the Deputies' claim that their cause of action was concealed amounts
to "a claim of equitable estoppel, whereby a defendant who causes a delay in the bringing
of a cause of action is estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a defense to
the action."8 Warren, 838 P.2d at 1129. This court has previously held that
[t]he application of facts to the legal standard of equitable
estoppel is a mixed question of fact and law. Similar to the
doctrine of waiver, the determination of equitable estoppel is
"a highly fact-dependent question, one that we cannot
profitably review de novo in every case because we cannot
hope to work out a coherent statement of the law through a
course of such decisions."
Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Pena,
869 P.2d at 938). Thus, the court grants "broadened discretion" to the finder of fact
regarding a claim of equitable estoppel. See id.
In this case, the Council determined, on three separate occasions, after hearing
witness testimony and considering other evidence, that the three-month rule began to run
the rule. Second, only the Council saw the witnesses' testimony, took evidence, and was
privileged to participate in the case, so to speak, in the trenches.
The County argued below that the Deputies could not assert that the discovery rule had
tolled the three-month rule because equitable estoppel cannot be asserted against a
governmental entity. (R. 432-33) As the County noted, in Weese v. Davis Co. Comm'n,
834 P.2d 1 (Utah 1992), the Supreme Court stated that "Utah recognizes the general rule
that estoppel may not be asserted against a governmental entity." Id. at 4-5. However,
this general rule does not apply when the facts show "some compelling cause, such as
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in December 1996, when the Deputies met with Sheriff Bateman and first discovered the
facts that formed their cause of action. This determination, which is in essence a
determination that the three-month rule was tolled by the discovery rule, is a question of
fact that should be afforded considerable discretion, reversed only if it is so lacking in
record support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. As discussed below, the
record amply supports the Council's finding that the Deputies' grievance was timely
filed.
2.

The Council's timeliness determination was supported by the record
and thus should be upheld.

The Council's finding that the triggering event for the Deputies' grievance did not
occur until December 1996 was well supported in the record and thus should not be
disturbed on review. The Deputies met with Sheriff Bateman on December 17, 1996,
eight days after, and in direct response to, Sergeant Morgan's disclosure of illegal testing
activities. Sheriff Bateman's December 30, 1996, response disclosed, for the very first
time, the erroneous basis upon which the Deputies had been denied the promotion in
1991 - that "Shift Supervisor was never a ranked position" in the Department, an
assertion the Sheriff later abandoned in sworn testimony before the Council. This
disclosure also revealed, for the very first time, that the Sheriff had acted on this false
premise in every promotional "testing" process utilized by the Department since the
elimination of the Shift Supervisor rank in 1991. The Sheriff also acknowledged, for the
first time, that there had been "irregularities" in the Department's promotional processes,
dishonesty, fraud, or collusion." Id. at 5. Thus, the general rule expressed in Weese does
not apply to bar the Deputies' claims.

processes in which the Deputies had participated but were unsuccessful. The Council
ultimately characterized those "irregularities" as "inconsistent, biased, and capricious"
testing. In other words, the Deputies did not know, and had no way of knowing, the
factual basis for the Department's failure to promote them until December 1996.
In addition, the record before the Council clearly establishes that Deputies were
repeatedly assured by Department management that they would be treated fairly as a
result of the "reclassification" of their ranked positions and the Sheriff personally assured
them that he would "make things right." The Deputies were urged by the Department to
resolve their issues internally, and there was considerable institutional pressure for them
to do so. One desiring promotion and success within the Department is unlikely to find it
if he or she is perceived as unwilling to work within the system. The Deputies were more
than willing, and made every effort to do so. At the Department's urging, the Deputies
continued to apply for promotions within the Department. However, unbeknownst to the
Deputies until December 1996, the promotion and eligibility requirements fluctuated
widely and were often disregarded by Department management.
The Council correctly held that it was not until these facts were revealed in
December 1996 that the Deputies were on notice of their claim and that the three-month
rule began to run. The Deputies therefore had three months from the revelation of these
facts within which to pursue their grievance, and it is undisputed that they timely did so.
Alternatively, the Department's repeated false assurances to the Deputies, and its
concealment of the promotion irregularities, justify any delay in proceeding with the
grievance. As a matter of equity, the County should not now be allowed to benefit from
222027.8

fraudulent affirmative measures that were taken to prevent or delay the Deputies from
pursuing legal recourse. The Department's fraudulent behavior toward the deputies in
effect equitably tolled the Deputies claim until the December 1996.
Any benefit of a doubt in this regard must be resolved in favor of upholding the
Council's decision, and this Court should give the proper deference to the Council's
decision. The record shows that the Deputies relied on the representations made by the
Department that they would be made Sergeants, and the record supports the Council's
determination that it was not until December 1996 that the Deputies discovered that these
representations had been false and that the Department had engaged in unlawful
employment practices in promoting others before the Deputies. Given the rosy promises
that were being made, apparently with the intent of dissuading the Deputies from
proceeding with a grievance, and the promotion irregularities that were hidden from the
Deputies, the County should not be heard to complain about timeliness.
3.

Even if reviewed as a question of law, the Council's timeliness
determination should be upheld because it was not a gross and flagrant
abuse of discretion.

As discussed above, the Council's determination that the Deputies timely filed
should be reviewed for clear error, "giving deference to the initial decision maker on
questions of fact because it stands in a superior position from which to evaluate and
weigh the evidence and assess the credibility and accuracy of witnesses' recollections."
Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). However, even if this
Court reviews the Council's determination as a matter of law, it should nonetheless be
afforded an extra measure of discretion and reversed only if the ruling was a gross and
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flagrant abuse of discretion. This is so for two reasons: first, because of the procedural
posture in which this case arose, namely, an appeal of a Rule 65B petition for
extraordinary writ; and second, because the Council is uniquely well-suited to resolve
disputed issues of fact regarding its three-month rule and the interaction of that rule's the
procedural requirements with the overriding goal of encouraging the application of merit
principles in public employment. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-3 (defining merit
principles); id §17-33-4 (stating Council must be comprised of "persons in sympathy
with the application of merit principles to public employment").
On review of a petition brought under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, "[w]here the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, the court's review
shall not extend further than to determine whether the [tribunal] has regularly pursued its
authority." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(4). It is undisputed that the proceedings before the
Council were judicial in nature. (R. 476) Both sides were represented by legal counsel,
and were given the opportunity to put on evidence, call witnesses, and cross-examine
opposing witnesses. See, e.g., Atiya v. Salt Lake County, 988 F.2d 1013, 1019 (10th Cir.
1993) (stating that proceedings before Salt Lake County Career Service Council were
judicial in nature). Thus, this Court's review should "not extend further than to
determine whether [the Council] has regularly pursued its authority." Utah R. Civ. P.
65B(d)(4); see also State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) allows a reviewing court "to direct the particular exercise of
[an inferior tribunal's] judgment to correct [that tribunal's] abuse of discretion." Stirba
972 P.2d at 922; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2)(A) (authorizing relief "where an
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inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded
its jurisdiction or abused its discretion"). Although Rule 65B uses the familiar term
"abuse of discretion," a term that is used even in run-of-the-mill standard of review
discussions, as applied by our appellate courts "'abuse of discretion' for Rule
65B(d)(2)(A) writs must be much more blatant than the garden variety 'abuse of
discretion' featured in routine appellate review." Stirba, 972 P.2d at 922. Moreover, this
highly deferential standard of review is not limited to review of the lower tribunal's
findings of fact, or even its resolution of mixed questions of fact and law. Rather, the
more deferential standard is also applied to the lower tribunal's resolution of issues of
law. As this court noted in Stirba, "a simple mistake of law does not qualify as the kind
of gross and flagrant abuse of discretion necessary for a Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ to issue."
Id. at 923. In sum, a lower tribunal's exercise of discretion should only be overturned via
a Rule 65B writ "in the face of a particularly egregious and momentous legal error." Id.
Even assuming for argument's sake that the Council's timeliness determination
was erroneous, any such error cannot rightly be considered a gross and flagrant abuse of
discretion. The Council considered the issue of timeliness on several occasions, hearing
testimony and taking evidence, and in each instance reaffirmed its initial determination
that the three-month rule should begin to run in December 1996, when the Deputies
learned the facts necessary to create their cause of action. Not only did the Council
reaffirm its decision three times, but the trial court also affirmed the legitimacy of the
Council's decision and effectively resisted the reconstituted Council's attempt to vacate
the first decision.
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The second reason the Council's decision should be allowed to stand, even if it is
reviewed as a question of law, is that the Council is uniquely suited to consider the
application of its three-month rule and whether, in any given case, such procedural
considerations should trump the Council's overarching goal of fostering the application
of merit principles to public employment. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-3 (defining merit
principles); id. §17-33-4 (stating Council must be comprised of "persons in sympathy
with the application of merit principles to public employment").
The Council, which is statutorily charged with the task of ensuring that merit
principles are followed in career service employment, should have the discretion to
decide whether a particularly egregious case, like this one, warrants unique treatment.
The Council, after all, is interpreting its own rules and should have some flexibility in
doing so. In this case, for example, the Council was so concerned with what it heard that
it felt compelled to castigate the Department for its conduct over the years, and request
that it correct the errors of its ways. Perhaps even more important, if this Court does not
afford the Council a measure of discretion in determining what its own rules mean, this
Court will, in the future, be obligated to review internal personnel rules as a matter of
law. We respectfully submit that the Council is in a much better position to determine
and apply its own rules, consistent with its statutory obligation to respect and uphold
merit principles.
CONCLUSION
The Council's determination that the Deputies' grievance was timely filed, and
that the three-month rule began to run in December 1996 when the Deputies learned the
222027.8
Q1

facts necessary to create their cause of action, should have been reviewed by the trial
court as a mixed question of fact and law, with considerable deference afforded the
Council's subsidiary findings of fact. Because the trial court improperly reviewed the
Council's determination for correctness, affording no deference to the Council's superior
ability to implement personnel rules and evaluate the credibility of the evidence presented
to it on three separate occasions, this Court should reverse the trial court's order granting
the County's Petition for Extraordinary Writ. Such a reversal would, in effect, reinstate
the Council's determination that the Deputies filed timely.
This result would best serve the interests of justice and of furthering the meritbased system of public employment at issue in this case. Both the Council and the trial
court found that the County's promotion practices were riddled with irregularities, even
arbitrary and capricious, and the County has uot appealed that determination. The
Council, which is statutorily mandated to be "in sympathy" with merit principles,
concluded that the Deputies should be promoted to Sergeant and given back pay. If there
is any doubt regarding the timeliness of the Deputies' filing, equity and the interests of
justice demand that the doubt be resolved in favor of the Deputies' case being resolved
on the merits, rather than by a procedural ruling based on an erroneous application of the
law.
ADDENDUM
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellants'
appendix of important documents is bound as part of this brief.
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June 30, 1997

Deputy George S. A l e x a n d e r s
P.O. B o x 607
American Fork, UT 84003
Deputy Charles H. Martin
487 N. 1030 E.
Orem, U T 84<SC3
Dear Deputies Martin and AJexanderson,
Thank you for your patience in awaiting a reply regarding your grievance hearing. As a
Career Service Council we felt like we needed to take the time to review your case carefully. The
following is an outline of your statement of relief and our recommendation resulting from the
hearing.
L)

Retroactive reinstatement to the rank of Sergeant (formerly named Shift
Supervisor), non-probationary and competent level

The council does not recommend that you be reinstated to the rank of Sergeant because
you never achieved that rank. However, we do recommend that you both be promoted to the
Sergeants rank, elective immediately.
Appropriate Reparations
*)
Back Pay at Sergeants level of compensarion
b)
Attorneys Fees and Costs

Sousrss^r^^r^r ^ ^ - s ^ w
* < * e r POSabl= rciatKl

of Sergean:.
~l^£Uttah[S
our scope
3)

,
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commensurate with the rant

^ " * * ° n * « « ° ™ * * « « « * « « , because it is outade

Implementation of Standardized and Uootased Testing Procedures

It appears that promotions have been based on arfchrarv rr,*.„%, xprocedures aoDoir tnccnastr-t h , « ^ , T
^rtrary criteria. The current testing
encioyees were p r o n ^ S T L ,
« d capnexou* Evidence supported the Set that some
. /ees ere promoted to the Sergeant's rank that did not meet me q u a l i f i e r outlined in

the various policies.
The council recommends that the county implement standardized and unbiased testing
procedures. All policies regarding promotional testing should be updated, consistent with each
other, clearly communicated to all applicable employees, and carefully followed.
4)

Written Admission and Apology, to be placed in Deputies personnelfiles,that
failure to give Deputies earned rank of Sergeant was an oversight

The council believes a written admissions and apology is not necessary. The above
outlined recommendations should be adequate to substantiate and resolve your concerns.
In addition to the above statement of relief the council would also like to address the
concern brought up by you regarding your statement that you were not promoted because you arc
not members of the Mormon faith. The council feels there was insufficient evidence to support
this.
The council wouid also like to reconfirm that we did not feel like this hearing should be
bzixzd because af che timefiness offiling.We felt like yaur discussion with SherifFBateman in
December, 1996 was the date that should drive the time for filing. You filed within 90 days of that
date, therefore, wc proceeded with the hearing.
Again, thank you for your patience in bringing this issue to resolution,
/

Deborah L. Gatcicy, Utah County Career Service Council

Ryp: R_ Bcuhring, Utah Countv^areer Service Council
Kay Bryscn - Utah County Attorney
personnel file

Date
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Date

David L. Blackner, Utah State Bar No. 5376
THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID L. BLACKNER
Attorney for Respondents
Kearns Building Mezzanine
134 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)521-3480

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH COUNTY,
Petitioner,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
DISMISS AND REMANDING MATTER
TO UTAH COUNTY CAREER SERVICE
COUNCIL

vs.
GEORGE S. ALEXANDERSON and
CHARLES H. MARTIN,
Respondents.

Case No.: 970400590
Judge: The Honorable Howard H. Maetani

Respondents Alexanderson and Martin's motion to dismiss petitioner Utah
County's petition for extraordinary relief came on for hearing before the Court on
October 1, 1997 at 8:30 a.m., the Honorable Howard H. Maetani presiding. Respondents
were represented in person at die hearing by theii counsel, David L. Blackner. Petitioner
was represented in person at the hearing by its counsel, M. Cort Griffin.
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings filed by the parties, and having heard
arguments on the matter, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
a. That respondents' motion to dismiss the petition is hereby denied.

b. That this matter be remanded to the Utah County Career Service Council (the
"Council") for the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law in connection with its
decision of June 30, 1997, but that this Court will retain jurisdiction over this matter
pending the entry of such findings of fact and conclusions of law by the Council.
c. That in connection with the entry of such findings of fact and conclusions of
law, the Council may, among other things, as it, in its discretion, may elect:
i.

Request that one, both, or neither of the parties prepare proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law for adoption by the
Council;

ii.

Hear any objections to such proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law as it may choose to hear and consider;

iii.

Review all or such portions of the record as it may deem necessary
or desirable;

iv.

Take such further testimony, or accept such further evidence, as it
may deem necessary or desirable;

v.

Make such changes, additions, or modifications to its decision as it
may deem necessary or desirable; and

vi.

Do such other things, and take such further actions, as it may deem
necessary or desirable to clarify or enhance the record of the
proceedings for eventual review by this Court.

d. That petitioner Utah County arrange for, and bear the cost of, the preparation
of a hearing transcript by a certified court reporter and that such transcript be provided to

the Council in connection with the preparation of such findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
e. That upon the entry of such findings of fact and conclusions of law by the
Council, and the delivery of the record to the Court, this Court will then perform its
review thereof in accordance with applicable law and as requested by Utah County in its
petition for extraordinary relief.
DATED this ^

7

day of October, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

Career Service Council
100 East Center Street, Suite 2200
Provo,UT 84606

0

i\

' 4vj

November 22, 1999

Deputy George S. Alexanderson
P.O. Box 706
American Fork, UT 84003
Charles H. Martin
487 North 1080 East
Orem,UT 84057
Utah County Attorney's Office
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100
Provo,UT 84606
Stephen W. Cook
323 South 600 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
RE: Fourth Judicial District Court / Case #: 970400590

toward
To the above parties:
The Career Service Council has reviewed the documents on file in this informally administered
case. None of the current members of the council were involved in the hearings or the decision
rendered in this matter. After review, the council determines the previous decision dated June
30, 1997, is a "final decision" in this matter as contemplated by UCA 63-46b-5(i).
All proceedings in this matter were conducted informally according to the history and practice of
the Career Service Council. The informal record is, in significant parts, unintelligible and
impossible to review.
The council determines that the appeal for judicial review of this informal proceeding be
pursuant to UCA 63-46b-15.
1

Sincerely,

(l(mt

/(• ly-gy

Mark F. Robinson - Career Service Council

Date

2

jurth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

H/iofo 1M\

DfipiJty

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH COUNTY,

:
Petitioner,

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
: AND SCHEDULING CONFERENCE

vs.
GEORGE S. ALEXANDERSON and
CHARLES H. MARTIN,

Case No. 970400590
Judge Howard H. Maetani

Respondents.

The above-entitled matter came regularly before the Court, the Honorable
Fred D. Howard, presiding, on March 3, 2000, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. for pretrial conference. The Petitioner was represented by M. Cort Griffin. The
Respondents were present and were represented by Stephen W. Cook. After
having reviewed the file, heard the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised
in the premises, the Court finds and concludes that the following Order To Show
Cause should be directed at the Utah Career Service Council.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The members of the Utah Career Service Council, viz., Sherlynn

Fenstermaker, Lloyd Evans and Mark F. Robinson, are hereby ordered to appear
before the above court on May 1, 2000, at the hour of 10:30 a.m. and show
cause, if any they have, or the Utah Career Service Council has, why the Court

should not proceed and enter an appropriate order relative to the pending case
and/or whether the Utah County Career Service Counsel has satisfied the 1997
Remand Order
2.

The Court shall also conduct a scheduling conference with the

parties on May 1, 2000, at the hour of 10 30 a.m.
DATED this < / ^ d a y ofMarch, 2000.
BY THE COURT

,KtJ£j^

Approved as to form-

M CORT GRIFF^IN/y
Utah County Attorneyig/Office

STEPHEN W COOK
Attorney for Respondents

A

UTAH COUNTY CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL

CHARLES MARTIN

:

RULING

GEORGE ALEXANDERSON
Appellant,
vs.
PERS ONNEL DEPARTMENT
UTAH COUNTY GOVERNMENT

:

Employer

The previous Utah County Career Service Council, (none of whom are still on the
Council) heard the case and entered a decision. Utah County filed a petition for extraordinary
relief from that decision. The Court, in or about October 27, 1997 entered an Order of Remand
to the Council. The Council reviewed the record and filed a response. The Court ruled the
Councils response inadequate and directed, pursuant to an Order to Show Cause, a satisfactory
response to the Remand Order.
The existing Council has spent many hours with this case, reviewing written record and
attempting to understand the audio tape record, which in many parts is "inaudible". After
completing its review, this Council is unanimous in its disagreement with the prior Council's
decision.

The Order of Remand dated October 27, 1997, permits and directs this Council, in its
discretion, to:

iii.

Review all or such portions of the record as it may deem necessary or desirable;

v.

Make such changes, additions, or modifications to its decision as it may deem
necessary or desirable; and

vi.

Do such other things, and take such further actions, as it may deem necessary or
desirable to clarify or enhance the record of the proceeding for eventual review by
this Court.

Upon completion of the foregoing, this Court would then perform its review in
accordance with applicable law as requested by Utah County in its petition for extraordinary
relief.
As directed, the present Council now makes and enters its Findings of Fact and
Conclusion of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

A Classification Study occurred and was completed on July 15, 1991, where the
title of Shift Supervisor was eliminated. In response to this change Sergeant
2

positions were created at the jail.
2.

When the title of shift supervisor was eliminated, those who had such jobs
continued working as Correction Specialists with no change in grade or salary.

3.

Martin and Alexanderson who had been Shift Supervisors applied to become
Sergeants in 1991 and were not promoted.

4.

Deputy Martin wrote a letter in April 1992, explaining how he felt about the
process of choosing Sergeants. No formal grievance was filed at that time.

5.

Application were taken for various Sergeant positions between 1991 and 1996.
Martin and/or Alexanderson applied for some, but not all of those positions. They
were not promoted. No grievance was filed for any of those hiring decisions.

6.

A meeting was held on December 17, 1996, at which Martin and Alexanderson
explained to Sheriff Bateman their frustration with hiring decisions made between
1991 and 1996. Bateman prepared a memorandum of that meeting dated
December 30, 1996, addressing their concerns.

7.

Grievance dated January 10, 1997, was filed after reviewing Sheriff Bateman7 s
memo dated December 30, 1996, by Martin and Alexanderson.

3

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The grievance of George Alexanderson and Charles Martin dated January 10, 1997 was
not timely and is dismissed. Any prior contrary finding or conclusion of the previous Council is
vacated.

Respectfully,

(Tsherlynnl^n^

County Career Service Council Chair

*-y-7?-

loyd Evans - Utah County Career Service Council

Mark JR-Robinson - Utah County Career Service Council

4
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Date

»$/-<? 7- ^ Z 7
Date

Date

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling with postage
prepaid theron this " 7 ^ day of H-pH I , "ZOCO , to the following:
Charles Martin
487 North 1080 East
Orem, UT 84057
George Alexanderson
P.O. Box 706
American Fork, UT 84003
Stephen W. Cook
323 South 600 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Utah County Attorney's Office
100 East Center
Provo, UT 84606
Utah County Sheriff
3075 North Main
Spanish Fork, UT 84660

Sarah Kuiz
Career Service Council Secretary
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4TH DISTRICT COURT, PROVO DEPT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
ORAL ARGUMENT

vs.

Case No: 970400590 AA

GEORGE S ALEXANDERSON Et al,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

FRED D. HOWARD
September 12, 2000

wendyw

PRESENT
Defendant(s): GEORGE S ALEXANDERSON
CHARLES H MARTIN
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): M CORT GRIFFIN
Defendant's Attorney(s): STEPHEN W. COOK
Video
Tape Number:
0038
Tape Count: 8:49

HEARING
TAPE: 0038
COUNT: 8:49
Mr Cook addresses the Court. Mr Griffin responds. Mr Cook
responds. Counsel submits for decision.The Court finds that the
first decision was final, District Court retained jurisdiction and
findings must be consistent with first decision of the board.
Mr Griffin requests opportunity to address the limitation of
actions. Mr Griffin is given 90 days to brief the case and Mr Cook
30 days to respond. Mr Cook is to prepare the order.

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH COUNTY,
ORDER SUSTAINING
OBJECTIONS

Petitioner,
vs.

:

GEORGE S. ALEXANDERSON and
CHARLES H. MARTIN,
Respondents.

Case No. 970400590
:
:

The Respondents' Objection To April 27, 2000, Ruling Of Career
Service Council came regularly before the Court, the Honorable Fred D.
Howard, Fourth Judicial District Court Judge, presiding on September 12,
2000. The Petitioner was represented by its counsel, M Cort Griffin. The
Respondents were present and were represented by their counsel, Stephen
W. Cook. After having reviewed the file including the memoranda of the
parties, after having heard the oral arguments of the parties, ana after having
been fully informed in the premises, the Court finds and concludes that the
Utah County Career Service Council (herein "Council") failed to follow the
Court's Order dated October 27, 1997, and exceeded the Council's
jurisdiction by entering it's April 27, 2000 Ruling, that the Court by it's
October 27, 1997 Order had retained jurisdiction oyer the matter and the

purpose of the Court's Order was for the entry of findings of fact and
conclusions of law consistent with the Council's Ruling of June 30, 1997, that
the Council's April 27, 2000 Ruling was inconsistent with it's June 30, 1997
Ruling, that the Court should disregard the Council's April 27, 2000 Ruling,
that the Court should proceed and decide the issues raised by the
Petitioner's Petition For Extraordinary Relief in light of the Council's actions
without the benefit of findings of fact and conclusions of law, and that the
Respondents' objections to the April 27, 2000 Ruling of the Utah County
Career Service Council should be sustained.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The Respondent's Objections to the Council's April 27, 2000

Ruling is sustained and the Court will disregard such ruling as being outside
the jurisdiction of the Council and in disregard of the Court's Order dated
October 27, 1997.
2.

The Court will proceed to hear the merits of the Petitioner's

Petition For Extraordinary Relief in the absence of formal findings of fact and
conclusions of law based upon the transcript, exhibits, and record of the
proceedings.
3.

The Petitioner shall file any appropriate motion and

corresponding memoranda in support of the merits of the Petitioner's Petition
For Extraordinary Relief on or before January 10, 2001. The Respondents

Order **** oaee 2

shall have until February 15, 2001, in which to file a response. The Petitioner
shall then have twenty days in which to file a reply if desired.
DATED this Z 2 ^ a y of

/%^Wi

2000.

nrrlflt- * * * *

.™

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
STEPHEN W. COOK, being duly sworn, says:
That he is the attorney for herein; and that he served the attached
ORDER SUSTAINING OBJECTIONS upon:
M. Cort Griffin
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center Street, Suite 2400
Provo, Utah 84606
Utah County Career Service Counsel
100 East Center Street, Suite 2200
Provo, Utah 84606

by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and depositing the
same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid thereonjn the United States
mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 6. day oLS%fefnb%r, 2000.

JLcJbd^
STEPHEN W. COOK
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of September,

2000.
""" Notary PtibHc
ELIZABETH RSRIE

i
,

323 South 600 East, #200
Salt Lake CHy, Utati 84102
My Commission Eapfres
January 29,2003

8
|

State of Utah

J

osaaai scram masn masot ascwi IBBOB arudS

C\rr\&r * * * * m o p J.

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Petitioner,

vs.

Case # 970400590 AA

GEORGE S. ALEXANDERSON,
CHARLES H. MARTIN,
Hon. Fred D. Howard
Respondents.

The above-entitled matter came before the court on the Petitioner's Motion for Extraordinary
Relief The court having reviewed the Petition, and the Respondent's Obj ection thereto; and the court
having considered the relevant documents and the parties' respective arguments makes the following
decision.
ANALYSIS AND RULING
I.

Standard of Review
Under Utah R.Civ.P. 65B(d)(2)(A), this court may grant appropriate relief "where an inferior

court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or
abused its discretion." This court acts as an appellate court and will accord the Career Services
Council (hereafter, the Council) broad deference in its findings of fact, but will review the Council's
conclusions of law for correctness.

1

II.

Merit Principles
In its June 30, 1997, letter of decision to Deputies Martin and Alexanderson, the Council

specifically found that "promotions were based on arbitrary criteria. The current testing procedures
appear inconsistent, biased and capricious. Evidence supported the fact that some employees were
promoted to the Sergeant's rank that did not meet the qualifications outlined in the various policies."
The Council did not make specific citations to the record to support its findings.
The record and pleadings in this case are voluminous and this court will not attempt to reiterate point by point the evidence in support and contrary to the Council's findings. After fully
reviewing the transcript of the Council hearings, and the pleadings filed by both parties, this court
finds sufficient evidence to uphold the Council's finding that the testing procedures were at best
inconsistent, and very likely involved subjective criteria to the point of being arbitrary and violative
of merit principles.
Of specific concern to the court is the use of the Jail Policies and Procedures Manual (JPPM)
by the County. The County argues that the JPPM is advisory and not binding between the County and
its employees. While such an argument may attempt to place the County on firm legal ground, it
cannot do so where the JPPM was used as a sword against employees and a shield to protect the
County from liability. In this matter, officer employees were expected to "have read and expressed
their clear understanding of the material to the satisfaction of the Jail Training Officer," even though
it had no legal effect whatsoever. The court is persuaded that the manner in which the JPPM was

2

utilized communicated to officer employees that it could be relied upon despite the disclaimer. It is
the County's position that while the JPPM is non-binding and can be changed at any time, an
employee is expected to know and understand all of this non-binding material. Such an approach is
inherently unfair as illustrated with the following examples.
Section 150.0 states that "the retention and promotion of all jail staff members will be based
on the demonstration of merit, specified qualifications, and competitive examinations." To the
deputies' assertion that this provision was violated, the County responds that even if it was, it does
not matter because it was not binding in any case. Assuming the County is correct, however, this
circumstance leaves the deputy applicant unable to assess what he or she nees to do to qualify for
promotion. It is reasonable for the deputy to believe that the policies described in the JPPM will be
followed; and if are not binding, the county has an obligation to give adequate advance notice to
employees of where they intend to vary from the JPPM directions.
Another example is § 150.2(1) which states that "all staff members who desire promotion will
be subject to (a) written examination, (b) oral interviews and (c) review evaluations and length of
service." The County argues that the phrase "subject to" means that while the County may use these
criteria in the promotion process it is not required to because it is given discretion and flexibility.
Further, it contends that even if it does mean they must consider such criteria, no violation of merit
principles occurred because this provision is not binding. However, the court is unpersuaded by such
argument because again, a deputy is unable to assess what criteria will be utilized in the promotion

3
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process notwithstanding published JPPM criteria. Numerous other illustrations of conflict and
contradiction with the use of the JPPM and the promotion process are contained in the parties'
pleadings.
In addition to the preceding, the court also notes the argument of the Petitioner that ultimately
it is unimportant whether the promotion process differs from one hiring to the next so long as all of
the individual applicants are equally treated within the same promotion process. The court strongly
disagrees with this argument. Such an argument ignores the possibility that the playing field can be
slanted before the process even begins. With the promotion requirements in a constant state of flux,
applicants are unable to reasonably and accurately assess the testing procedures and the subjective
weight given to each of the promotion criteria from one hiring to the next. The applicants are unable
to reasonably forecast the promotion qualifications and make advance preparations for his or her
application. Further, the process is subject to manipulation to favor or prevent qualified individuals
from acquiring promotions for reasons other than merit principles.
Taken together, this court is persuaded that there is sufficient evidence to support
Respondents' claim that the County deviated from a regular process of promotion based on merit
principles. Therefore, the finding of the Council on this issue will not be overturned.
III.

Statute of Limitations
The court next examines the question of whether as a matter of law, Respondents' claims are

barred by the statute of limitations. In its letter decision the Council stated that "we did not feel like

4

this hearing should be barred because of the issue of timeliness. We felt like your discussion with
Sheriff Bateman in December 1996 was the date that should drive the time for filing. You filed within
90 days of that date, therefore, we proceeded with the hearing." This decision is a conclusion of law
that must be reviewed for correctness.
By their own claim, Respondents expected that all shift supervisors would be promoted to
Sargent after the 1991 salary survey. Neither Respondent was promoted, a fact known by each of
them in 1991. The cause of action of each Respondent arose at that time, the time of their nonpromotion.
Section VILE. 1 of the Utah County Office of Personnel Management Rules and Regulations
states:
Any career service employee who has completed a Schedule B probationary period
or a promotional trial period having a grievance over merit principles may appeal to
the Career Service Council. The employee must file a written notice with the
personnel director within three months of the date of the occurrence.
Utah case law holds that "Generally, a cause of action accrues and the relevant statute of limitations
begin to run when the last event that will complete the cause of action occurs, and simple ignorance
of or obliviousness to the existence of a cause of action will not prevent the running of the statute of
limitations." Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds, Inc. 920 P.2d 575, 578 (Utah App. 1996). In this
matter, the record is clear that the statute of limitations period began when Respondents were passed
over for promotion in 1991. By express ordinance rule, they were to file their grievance complaint
within three months of such occurrence. They failed to bring their claim within the three months of
5

the alleged grievance.
After careful review of the parties' authorities and argument on this subject, the court is
persuaded that the Council erroneously relied on the December 1996 meeting with Sheriff Bat eman
as the "occurrence" that commenced the statute of limitations period. The court is unpersuaded by
the circumstances of this case that the conversation with Sheriff Bateman renewed the limitations
time period. Respondents' request that past grievances be "looked into" cannot be considered an
"occurrence" within the meaning of the statute of limitations. Otherwise, as correctly noted by
Petitioner, anytime an aggrieved party requested reconsideration, the limitations time period would
begin to run anew thus defeating public policies of the statute of limitations entirely.
Among other things, the statute of limitations prevents the "revival of claims that have been
allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared." Sew v. Security Title, 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 1995). A review of the hearing
transcript persuasively reveals that such described dangers are present in this case - documents have
been destroyed, witnesses are unable to remember important events, and other important witnesses
cannot be located.
There is no factual dispute that Respondents failed to properly raise their claim within three
months of the alleged grievance. The record is also void of facts that would allow this court to apply
the discovery, fraudulent concealment or the exceptional circumstances exceptions. For these reasons,
and those stated in Petitioner's memoranda, the statute of limitations has long passed and

6

Respondents' claims are barred as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, for the reasons stated above, the Petition for Extraordinary Relief is granted.
While there is merit to Respondents' claims that the County's promotion

process is inconsistent,

arbitrary and violative of merit principles, Respondents' claims are barred as a matter of law by the
Statute of Limitations.
The decision of the Career Services Council is respectfully reversed and Respondents' claims
dismissed. Counsel for Petitioner is to prepare an Order consistent with this ruling and submit it to
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to final submission to the Court for signature.

7

MAILING CERTIFICATE

~> "7 ~frn

I certify that tme copies of the foregoing order were mailed, postage prepaid, on the * I

day

of September 2001 to the following at the addresses indicated, to wit:

Stephen W. Cook
323 South 600 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

M. Court Griffin
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2400
Provo, UT 84606

n
Deputy Clerk
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
__\hJo'2L

VW1 Deputy

M. CORT GRIFFIN (4583)
Deputy Utah County Attorney
KAY BRYSON (0473)
Utah County Attorney
Attorneys for Respondent
100 East Center, Suite 2400
Provo, UT 84606
Telephone: (801)370-8001
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH

UTAH COUNTY,

:
Petitioner,

vs.
GEORGE S. ALEXANDERSON,
CHARLES H. MARTIN,
Respondents.

ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF
:
:
:

Case No. 970400590
Honorable Fred D. Howard

:

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing as regularly scheduled on the 27th day of July,
2001 at 1:30 p.m. before the Honorable Fred D. Howard. Petitioner, Utah County, was represented
by its attorney of record, M Cort Griffin, and Sheriff David Bateman was present on behalf of
Petitioner. Respondents were present and represented by their attorney of record, Stephen W. Cook.
The Court, having heard the arguments of the parties and having taken this matter under advisement,
and having considered the relevant pleadings, memoranda of the parties and the record, and being
fully advised in the premises HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:

That the Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the above entitled matter is hereby granted. The
decision of the' Utah County Career Service Council in this matter is respectfully reversed and
Respondents' claims are hereby dismissed for Respondents failure to timely file their grievances
before the Utah County Career Service Council.

DATED this pA day of _
BY THE

•<£ffiK£>

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that 1 mailed a copy of the foregoing Order Granting Petition for
Extraordinary Relief to the below named party at the address set forth below, this Icj
December, 2001.
Stephen W. Cook
323 South 600 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

^kfiana Q/]A-

2

day of

